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Abstract—Fuzzy systems can aid in diminishing uncertainty
and noise from biometric security applications by providing
an intelligent layer to existing physical systems to make them
reliable. In the absence of such fuzzy systems, a little random
perturbation in captured human biometrics could disrupt the
whole security system, which may even decline the authentication
requests of legitimate entities during protocol execution. In the
literature, few fuzzy logic-based biometric authentication schemes
have been presented; however, they lack significant security
features including perfect forward secrecy, untraceability, and
resistance to known attacks. This study, therefore, proposes
a novel two-factor biometric authentication protocol enabling
efficient and secure combination of physically unclonable func-
tions, a physical object analogous to human fingerprint, with
user biometrics by employing fuzzy extractor-based procedures
in the loop. This combination enables the participants in the
protocol to achieve Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS). The security
of the proposed scheme is tested using the well-known real-or-
random model. The performance analysis signifies the fact that
the proposed scheme not only offers PFS, untraceability, and
anonymity to the participants, but is also resilient to known
attacks using light-weight symmetric operations, which makes
it an imperative advancement in the category of intelligent and
reliable security solutions.
Index Terms—Fuzzy systems, biometric fuzzy extractor, mu-
tual authentication, physical unclonable function, user access.
I. INTRODUCTION
THE biometric verification is an integral part of human-centric systems, requiring features extraction and match-
ing patterns using the mathematical techniques from the realm
of artificial intelligence [1]. The fuzzy logic has effectively
been applied in numerous biometric-pattern matching systems,
including fingerprint recognition and face recognition, with
the objective to reduce the noise and diminish uncertainty
so that the system could behave with reliability, robustness
and precision [2]. Although the biometrics are particular
to an individual and remains static throughout the lifetime
of a person, yet the human biometric features tend to vary
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a little bit over a period of time, or there might be some
noise in the captured biometric template that might render the
security solutions inapplicable in the absence of fuzzy systems.
Due to such fuzzy system-based intelligence, the biometric
recognition systems are exceedingly replacing the conventional
password or token-based authentication systems. The biomet-
ric authentication mechanisms scan physical features to au-
thenticate an individual. The fingerprint-based authentication
systems have had more adoption compared to other biometrics,
such as face, iris, and voice, which is mainly due to their higher
accuracy rate and convenience [2], [3].
In a human-explainable client-server authentication model, a
remote user needs to access the data by logging into the smart
device and then ultimately putting the authentication request
to the server. This is performed by sending commands to the
server from the Internet for real time authentication decisions
[3]–[5]. The server renders the fog computing services to users
over a public communication channel. The communication
between servers and users should be protected from intruder.
Both participants need to mutually authenticate one another
by establishing an agreed session key before communication.
The identity of the user must remain anonymous, while the
user itself should remain untraceable, that is, the messages
of various sessions belonging to a particular user must re-
main indistinguishable, termed as untraceability [6]. The de-
synchronization attack may be initiated by malicious intruder
to loose the synchronization between legal participants. A
service provider must be able to quickly thwart an attack
destined to deplete its energy and other resources. Besides,
the scheme must ensure Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS) along
with other security features, such as a feature that ensures
the protection of session keys in case the long term secret
keys pertaining to the involved participants are revealed.
Hence, only the authorized users should be able to access
the services of reliable servers. Many current symmetric key
protocols suffer from the above-mentioned limitations, which
are mostly covered by engaging Public Key Cryptography
(PKC) protocols; however, PKC protocols are computationally
too expensive for the low-end, resource constrained devices.
Recently, Physically Uncloneable Functions (PUFs) have
been adopted for securing the communication and server-
based services due to their unique intrinsic behavior [7]. The
Fuzzy Extractor (FE) is employed for improving the strength
of mutual authentication and key agreement by removing the
noise from biometrics and output of PUF [8]. The biometrics
can be stored in an encrypted form on a device using FE and
it also takes care of minor changes in biometrics and possible
noise while capturing the biometric input. The functionality
of FE relies on a hamming distance between the stored and
captured biometric template. This distance must be adequately 
small for a viable authentication model [9], [10].
Many biometric authentication schemes, along the above 
lines, have been presented with a number of security limita-
tions such as lacking PFS, de-synchronization issues, denial 
of service attacks, and other known attacks [7], [11]–[18]. 
To enhance the resilience of the client-server-based authenti-
cation protocols using lightweight crypto-primitives, we have 
designed an authenticated key agreement scheme by efficiently 
unifying PUFs with fingerprint biometrics of users by keeping 
the fuzzy extractor in the loop. That is, the device, owned by a 
user, requires being equipped with PUF for enabling an agreed 
session key between the user and the server. The scheme is 
designed with two-factor authentication requirements, without 
the need of password during the registration or the login phase. 
This approach is not only secure but is also convenient for 
users. We have used a widely accepted Real-or-Random (ROR) 
model to verify the security strengths of the established session 
key [19].
In this scheme our intent is to ensure PFS besides preserving 
other security features including anonymity, untraceability, and 
resistance to known attacks, using lightweight symmetric key 
operations. Considering this, we designed an efficient and 
secure authenticated key agreement scheme by combining FE-
enabling biometrics and PUF. The main contribution of our 
work is as follows:
• Our main contribution lies with resolving the flaws, as
indicated above, by designing a two-factor user authenti-
cation protocol through exploiting the mechanics of FE-
enabled biometrics and PUF in a novel way. The users as
well as the owned PUF device, both have unique physical
properties that assist in establishing an agreed session key
between participants.
• The designed scheme eliminates the chances of leakage of
biometric information from the device. Being a two-factor
authentication protocol, the user can rely only on smart
card and biometrics of users for registration, logging
into the device, and session key establishment during the
execution of protocol without the need of password, the
third factor.
• The experiments, formal analysis, and informal analy-
sis are carried out. The results show that the designed
scheme, despite being a lightweight symmetric-key pro-
tocol commits significant security features, i.e. it may
thwart known attacks such as Denial of Service (DoS),
de-synchronization and man-in-the-middle attacks, and
also achieves untraceability and perfect forward secrecy
(PFS) by submitting the PUF-based challenge-response
pair towards server, a missing security feature in the
existing symmetric key protocols [20].
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II
provides a summary of the related work. Section III explains
the preliminary concepts. Section IV elucidates our proposed
model. Section V illustrates the formal and informal security
analysis. Section VI compares the performance efficiency of
the proposed model with other schemes. The last section
concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
This section illustrates the related work with respect to the
evolution of single factor to biometric three-factor authentica-
tion techniques. In conventional security systems, the identity
and password were used for remote logins into the system.
The Lamport scheme was the first such authentication method
utilizing insecure channels with a password table for storing
users’ verifiers [28]. Due to modification attacks in password
tables, Lee et al. [21] introduced a smart cards-based scheme
using the principle of ElGamal’s cryptosystem, which removed
the use of password tables. However, the forged identity prob-
lems [22] in smart card-based schemes lead the researchers
to move towards a three-factor biometric-based ElGamal’s
cryptosystem [11]. However, such schemes were exposed to
password modifications and masquerading attacks [12], which
were later addressed by other researchers to provide sufficient
mutual authentication. Later, Poh et al. introduced an improved
biometric scheme with an effective session key agreement
[13]. However, Poh et al.’s scheme is not able to maintain the
privacy of three-factor authentication parameters. To address
these shortcomings, Zhou and Ren presented a secure, mutual
authentication protocol by employing costly exponentiation
operations [14].
The biometric features may offer significant authentication
capabilities over the above discussed schemes based on mere
passwords or cryptographic keys [13], as far as the resistance
from copying, guessing, losing the key type issues are con-
cerned. Due to such properties, it becomes crucial to maintain
its privacy as well as security of those biometric factors during
authentication phase. However, the security of biometrics may
become a concern if it becomes compromised due to the
storage of corresponding biometric templates in smart cards or
servers [13]. To cover such risks many schemes [14] employed
keyed hash functions and fuzzy extractors for encrypting
the biometrics before storing on devices. Nevertheless, the
auxiliary data recovered from FE is not encrypted and is stored
directly on smart card or device, which makes susceptible
the privacy of biometric templates. Zhou and Ren presented
a threshold predicate encryption protocol for only revealing
the matched result without exposing the biometric data [14].
Wang et al. [24] also examined privacy-malicious threats
related to the exposure of biometrics databases by using
adversarial machine learning techniques. However, due to the
storage of encrypted biometrics in repository [14], [24], the
leakage concerns for the biometric data still exist with those
approaches.
The Han et al. [26] and Reddy et al. [27] employed public-
key based operations to ensure perfect forward secrecy, but
were susceptible to de-synchronization attacks. In recent years,
a few smart device and internet of things (IoT)-based security
solutions have adopted PUFs to assist in mutual authentication.
The peculiarity of Physically Uncloneable Functions (PUFs)
has made it attractive for adoption in building the secure
Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT)-based applications. PUFs
are designed with random disparities in Integrated Circuits
(ICs) while manufactured. Each PUF is designed with unique
physical signature which can neither be cloned nor rebuilt,
TABLE I
RELATED LITERATURE
Scheme Features Drawbacks Year
[21] One of the pioneer schemes supporting fingerprint-based authentication with the help of smart card and Elgamal cryptosystem Forged identity problems 2002
[22] Improved three-factor biometric authentication with the Elgamal cryptosystem Password modification and masquerading attacks 2004
[12] A three-factor biometric authentication scheme based on discrete logarithm problem Exposed to impersonation, replay, and temporary information attacks 2014
[23] A three-factor biometric authentication scheme based on modular exponentiation cryptographic operations Stolen device and Man-in-the-middle attack 2017
[24] Examined privacy threats related to the exposure of biometrics by using adversarial machine learning techniques The privacy leakage concerns still persist due to storage of encrypted biometrics. 2017
[25] PUF-based two-factor authentication scheme with the combination of biometrics De-synchronization attack, and unable to provide equivalent three-factor security 2018
[14] A secure Threshold Predicate Encryption protocol for encrypting the biometrics Costly exponentiation operations 2018
[13] Privacy preserving scheme for smart home user Unable to provide equivalent three-factor privacy to the user 2019
[26] Client-server three-factor authentication scheme employing elliptic curve cryptography operations De-synchronization attack, Anonymity, and server impersonation attack 2018
[27] Improved client-server three-factor authentication scheme employing public-key cryptography De-synchronization attack, costly crypto-primitives 2019
[7] PUF-based Wireless Sensor Network oriented scheme Denial of Service (DoS) threat due to direct use of PUF without removing its noise 2019
[20] Fuzzy extractor-based biometric symmetric authentication protocol for client server environment Man in the middle attack, DoS attack 2020
similar to human biometric features. In this connection, Bian
et al. [20] presented a PUF as well as fuzzy extractor-based
biometric symmetric authentication protocol for client server
environment. However, the scheme is vulnerable to denial of
service attack (DoS) on the server’s end. The server needs
to consult its repository for n number of times to verify the
identity of user, leading to DoS attack, where n is total number
of users. Besides, [20] suffers man-in-the-middle attack in case
the malicious intruder alters the message on its way from
server to user. Also Gope and Sikdar [25] employed PUF
with the combination of biometrics to authenticate the user.
However, on the down side, it suffered de-synchronization
attack. Later, Gope et al. [7] introduced another PUF-based
scheme for industrial wireless sensor networks; however the
biometrics were utilized directly without removing the noise
which could result in denial of service threat [20].
The above literature manifests that most of the three-
factor symmetric key-based schemes do not comply with PFS,
untraceability, and synchronization properties of security. To
serve the purpose, many of those schemes employed sym-
metric key-based as well as public key-based costly crypto-
primitives [26], [27]. Although, the schemes employing costly
primitives fulfill PFS, but could not preserve the other secu-
rity features including untraceability, or resistance to known
attacks such as DoS attack, de-synchronization attack, replay
attack, stolen-verifier attack etc. Therefore, an efficient se-
curity solution countering the above-mentioned flaws in the
schemes is inevitable. The related work is also summarized in
Table I.
III. PRELIMINARIES
This section presents preliminary details to assist readers in
understanding this article.
A. Physically Uncloneable Function
A PUF uniquely maps an input to a specific output [10].
The challenge and response-based input-output pair remains
unique for each PUF-based chip. A PUF-based circuit entails
the following features:
• The response of a PUF circuit is strictly a function of
unique manufacturing structure of the chip.
• The response of a PUF is always unpredictable.
• It is highly improbable to clone the PUF functionality.
• PUF’s characteristics remain stable over time, and they
are easy to be evaluated and implemented.
Since, PUF’s output depends on environment variables, any
alterations in the system can modify the output of the circuit.
Also, it is assumed that the interactions between PUF and
other devices cannot be tampered [22].
In challenge-response pair (CRP)-oriented PUF, the one-
way response R for a challenge C may be identified as
R ← G(C), where G represents PUF function. The PUFs
are integrated chips with unique internal structure that maps
one-way function from C to R. The hard prediction and easy
construction renders it a good candidate to be used as security
primitive for low-end devices. This is because the output of G
function relies on physical features, and any kind of tampering
attempt may change the behavior of device and hence makes
it ineffective.
B. Fuzzy Extractor
Fuzzy extractor procedures could be efficiently employed
to remove the noise from the output of PUF circuits, which
further enhances the reliability of PUF circuits. Zhang et
al. [18] analyzed the problems of dissipative screening and
missing measurements regarding discrete switching of fuzzy-
based systems. They proposed the solution by employing
random variables with the combination of “Bernoulli binary
distribution”. The fuzzy extractor consists of two procedures,
that is, 1) Generation function Gen(·) and 2) Reproduction
function Rep(·) which are described below:
Gen(·): Considering a challenge-response pair, that is,
Rsi=PUF (Chi), wherein the Gen(·) function in response
to Chi challenge, outputs a tuple bearing secret key Ri and
auxiliary data adi , that is, Gen(Rsi)=(Ri, adi).
Rep(·): In view of PUF-based output Rsi , the Rep(·)
extracts the same original key Ri by employing auxiliary
data adi, with a provision that the hamming distance between
existing PUF output R′si and the original PUF output Rsi is not
over a pre-established error absorbing threshold ψ. Therefore,
it ensures Rep(R′si , adi)=Ri.
In this regard, an assessment for error absorbing threshold
is provided by Cheon et al. [29]. That is, in case the hamming
distance between existing PUF output R′si and original PUF
output Rsi is η, and the number of bits in the input string is
bin, then ψ=η/bin.
C. Malicious Intruder Model
We assess the security features of contributed protocol
under Canetti-Krawczyk Model (CK) attack model [15]. The
capabilities of the malicious attacker under this model are
narrated below.
• A deceitful attacker I could intercept, erase, append, al-
ter, hold or replay the eavesdropped messages exchanged
among the legal entities.
• I may illegaly access the mobile gadget of user and
extract all of its stored contents employing power dif-
ferential analysis.
Fig. 1. System Model
• I could also launch recognized threats such as imperson-
ation attack, replay attack, forgery and man-in-the-middle
attacks.
• I may access short term ephemeral secrets from the user’s
storage, and long term secrets under the assumption of
CK model.
• The server is treated as a reliable trusted authority for the
purpose of registration.
D. System Setup
The system model represents the proposed remote mobile-
user authentication protocol. The mobile gadgets employed
in the system could be any kind of smart devices including
mobile phones, laptops, and tablets which are normally utilized
in a remote authentication system. The biometric authentica-
tion provides a way to authenticate any entity on the basis
of unique physical characteristics of an individual. The con-
tributed model is supposed to accomplish a fuzzy-extractor and
PUF induced biometric two-way authenticated key agreement
between server and mobile devices of users. In the current
system model, the mobile gadgets are outfitted with fingerprint
capturing sensor as well as PUF with strict adherence to
Gi function, while the server serves as a trusted party. The
mobile user registers and gets mutually authenticated with
the same trusted party as depicted in Fig. 1. After successful
authentication, the mobile users may access IoT data which is
readily updated on those servers.
IV. PROPOSED SCHEME
The PFS, anonymity, and untraceability features are mostly
addressed by PKC-based primitives used in the existing
protocols. Since PKC-based primitives are computationally
expensive, an alternative solution could be in the use of a
lightweight authenticated encryption using symmetric key op-
erations, which are deployable by low-end devices.Although,
few symmetric key-based security solutions have employed
biometrics and PUF to enhance the security [8], [20], the
security problems still persist in some way or other. Hence,
to attain the mentioned security objectives with low cost




Ui, Sj Mobile User, Trusted Server
IDi, IDs Identities of Ui and Sj
Ku, Ks Private secret keys of Ui and Sj
PUFi Physical Uncloneable Function for Ui
Bf Fingerprint biometric impression
Fg/Fr Fuzzy Extractor Generation and Reproduction
Nu, Ns Random nonces
Ek(·)/Dk(·) Symmetric encryption / decryption
I Malicious Intruder
SK Sesseion key between Ui and Sj
⊕, ‖ XOR , Concatenation
Ai, v Pseudo-identity, Encrypted parameter to compute Ai
h(·) Secure one-way hash function
Fig. 2. Proposed Model
key agreement scheme between an end user and a server inte-
grated with cloud and IoT environment. The proposed scheme
aims at constructing an agreed session key without taking the
password from the user, through employing PUF and fuzzy
extractor functions in the loop. During the initialization setup,
the i-th end user Ui and the j-th trusted authority or server Sj
choose their private keys, Ku and Ks, respectively. Notations
used in the scheme are shown in Table II. The proposed model
covers two important phases, that is, 1) Registration phase and
2) Login and authentication phase. These phases are described
below.
A. Registration phase
In this phase, the user Ui executes the registration procedure
with Sj in a secure channel. The detailed steps are elaborated
below:
1) Initially, the user Ui chooses an identity IDi and scans
his/her fingerprint biometrics Bf on a device. Then, the
user defines two random numbers x and r, as well as a
challenge Cni.
2) Next, the user Ui computes Vi = Gi(Cni) on PUF,
and employs Fg on Bf to generate the private key Ku
along with auxiliary data FU , that is, (Ku, FU ) = Fg
(Bf ). It then computes Z = h(IDi||Ku), Cn∗i =
Cni ⊕ h(Ku), and pseudo-identity NIDi = IDi ⊕
Cn∗i ⊕ h(Ku||x). Then, the user Ui sends {NIDi, <
Cn∗i , Vi >,Z,Regrq} to the server over a secure chan-
nel, bearing Regrq the registration request.
3) The server Sj verifies NIDi after receiving the request,
and chooses a random number y. Then, it computes
v = EKs(y,NIDi), Ai = h(Ks||y) ⊕ Z, and stores
NIDi, < Cn
∗
i , Vi > in its database. In addition, it sends
{Ai, v} to Ui on a confidential channel.
4) The user Ui, after getting the message, computes X =
h(IDi||Ku||x), E = h(IDi||r)mod n0, x∗ = x ⊕ E,
Wi = v ⊕ h(x||Ku), F ∗U = h(IDi||x)⊕ FU , and stores
{h(·), Ai,Wi, X, x∗, F ∗U , r} safely in its device.
B. Login Procedure
In the login phase, the user Ui initially inputs its identity
IDi, and imprints fingerprint Bf into the device. Next, it
performs the following steps:
1) By employing the Ui’s identity IDi, the user device
calculates E = h(IDi‖r)mod n0, x∗ = x ⊕ E, and
extracts FU = h(IDi‖x)⊕F ∗U . Then, it recovers the pri-
vate key Ku by computing Ku = Fr (Bf , FU ). Next, it
calculates and checks the equation X ?= h(IDi‖Ku‖x).
If the match is unsuccessful, it aborts; otherwise, the user
engenders a random integer Nu as well as a timestamp
Tu, and calculates Z = h(IDi‖Ku) and K = Ai ⊕ Z.
2) Next, it computes M1 = Nu ⊕ K, NIDi =
IDi ⊕ h(Ku||x), v = Wi ⊕ h(x‖Ku),M2 =
h(K‖NIDi‖Nu‖v‖Tu) and NID∗i = NIDi ⊕ Nu.
In M1, Nu is masked with the use of Ku. Next, Ui
sends the authentication request {v,NID∗i ,M1,M2} to
server.
C. Authentication and key agreement procedure
In mutual authentication phase, Sj upon receiving
{v,NID∗i ,M1,M2, Tu} executes the under-mentioned steps.
1) In the beginning, Sj checks Tu, and calculates
(y,NIDi) = DKs(v). Then, it extracts Nu by
calculating Nu=M1 ⊕ h(Ks‖y), and computes
NIDi = NID
∗
i ⊕ Nu. After validating NIDi,
it fetches the respective challenge-response pair




If this validity does not hold true, Sj terminates
the session. Otherwise, Sj computes engenders
two random integers Ns and y′, and calculates
C = h(Nu||h(Ks||y)). In addition, it computes
v′=EKs(y
′, NIDi),M3=EC(Ns, Cn∗i , v
′, h(Ks||y′))
and M4 = h(h(Ks||y)||NIDi||Nu||Ns||h(Cn∗i )).
Finally, it sends the message {M3,M4} to Ui.
2) Ui upon receiving the message calcu-




′, h(Ks||y′)) after decrypting M3 using
C ′ and validates NIDi against Cn∗i . Then, it further




Next, Ui computes Mus and auxiliary data Q by
using fuzzy extractor Gen(·), i.e. (Mus, Q)=Fg
(V̂i). Further, it computes M5=h(K||Ns) ⊕
Q,SK=h(NIDi||Mus||Nu||Ns||v||h(Cn∗i )),
and M6=h(SK||Mus||Ns). Next, it calculates
v′=M6 ⊕ h(Ns||Nu),W ′i=v′ ⊕ h(x||Ku), and replaces
Wi as W ′i in the user device. Finally, it sends the
message {M5,M6 } to Sj .
3) After receiving {M5,M6}, Sj computes Q=M5 ⊕
h(h(Ks||y)||Ns) , and Mus=Fr (Vi, Q) by using
Fr. Ultimately, it calculates the session key as
SK=h(NIDi||Mus||Nu||Ns||v||h(Cn∗i )) and validates




In formal security analysis, we perform the analysis of the
proposed scheme using a widely accepted RoR model [29],
for proving the mutual authenticity of a shared session key
among legitimate entities. In accordance with ROR model, a
malicious intruder I must distinguish a factual session key of
instance from a random key. In this model, two entities, i.e.
Ui and Sj are supposed to participate in authentication phase.
The informal analysis is also followed by the formal analysis
in this section. We elaborate security model, semantic security
of SK and related proofs below:
A. Security model
Participants: We suppose that
∏t
Sj




is the rth instance of user Ui, labeled as




Ui is said to be the instance
∏t
Sj








transcript of exchanged messages between user and server








are called as fresh
with the provision that related SK is not exposed to I.
Adversary: Considering the ROR model, the I can modify,
block, or remove the communication messages in transit.
Alternatively, I enjoys full authority over an insecure channel




∏r): To model an eavesdropping attack, I
can employ this query between Ui and Sj .
• Send(
∏t
,m): The Send query, being modeled as an





): This query models stolen device




): This query reveals existing session key SK
to I as agreed between
∏t and respective partner.
• Test(
∏t
): The semantic security of an established SK
between Ui and Sj relating to the indistinguishability of
ROR model [29], is modeled by Test query. Before the
initiation of game, a fair coin c is flipped, while I stores
its outcome to decide afterwards about the consistency of
Test query’s output. In case, with the use of Test query,
the SK is examined to be fresh, then
∏t outputs SK
if c = 1, or else if c = 0, it returns a random number.
Otherwise, it gives null ⊥.
B. Semantic security of SK
Following ROR model, I needs to differentiate between
the valid SK of instance, and a random secret. I may issue
many test queries to either of the instances, that is,
∏t or∏r. The output of Test query must be consistent with random
bit c. When the game ends, I makes a guess of bit c′ with
a purpose to win. I wins the game if both bits are equal,
that is, c′=c. The I’s advantage for breaking the semantic
security of suggested model
∏
in time t is symbolized as
AdvAkf∏ (t)=|2.P r[Succs]−1|, where Succs denotes the event
that I may win the game. The protocol
∏
shall be secure in
ROR model if the advantage AdvAkf∏ ≤ ϑ for any sufficiently
small ϑ > 0.
Random Oracle: In the scheme, the participating members
as well as I may access one-way hash function in addition to
PUF, as simulated by the defined random oracles.
Definition 1: Cryptographic Hashing function. The one-
way hashing function h : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}n represents a
deterministic function that inputs a string of dynamic length
and results in an output string of a predetermined length,
say n-bits. If AdvCr hI (τ) function denotes I’s advantage in
searching for hash collision,
AdvCr hI (τ) = Pr[(µ1, µ2)⇐R I : µ1 6= µ2 ∧ h(µ1) = h(µ2)].
(1)
An (ζ, τ)-intruder breaking the collision resistance of h(·)
suggests that AdvCr hI (τ) ≤ ζ with at most run time τ .
Definition 2: Protected PUF. Any PUF, say PUFa, will
be secure iff for two random input challenges Ch1, Ch2 ε
{0, 1}L it generates corresponding output responses Rs1, Rs2
ε {0, 1}L with minimum variation ds1 , while alternatively,
for any two distinct PUFs (PUFa, PUFb), the input challenge
Ch1 must produce distinctive form of responses Rs1, Rs2 ε
{0, 1}L having at least ds2 amount of variation. Alternatively,
Pr[HD(PUFa(Ch1), PUFa(Ch2)) > ds1] = 1− ε, (2)
Pr[HD(PUFa(Ch1), PUFb(Ch1)) > ds2] = 1− ε, (3)
where the parameter ε is negligibly small, Ch1 and Ch2 are
the two challenges chosen randomly by the intruder, HD
be the hamming distance, while ds1 and ds1 symbolize for
thresholds of error tolerance in PUF.
C. Security Proof
The following theorem 1 adequately proves that our protocol
supports SK-based security.
Theorem 1: If we assume I to be a probabilistic polynomial
time (PPT) intruder executing
∏
in time t where ` is the
number of bits in Bf . The advantage of intruder for breaking
semantic security of contributed model
∏
for extracting the
session key SK by employing the given number of hash and
PUF queries is derived as










where qh, qPf , qse represent the number of queries for hash,
PUF , and send oracles, the |hash|, |PUF | correspond to
range space in hash and Pf (·) functions, respectively, while
the factors C ′ and s′ are Zipf’s parameters [19].
Proof: As per the proofs [19], we formulate a sequence
of five games denoted as Ge, where {0 ≤ e ≤ 4} for verifying
the security of SK in our protocol. The Succsj characterize
an event wherein I may guess the bit c in Ge. The elaborated
discussion about these games is shown below.
Game G0: This game is supposed to be a factual attack
by I against our biometric authentication scheme in ROR-
based model. Since, the bit c should be chosen in the start of
G0, it is obvious that
AdvAkf∏ (t) = |2.P r[Succ0]− 1| (5)
Game G1: The game G1 is translated from G0 by




∏r). Then, I needs to initiate Test query for
evaluating the variation in legitimate SK and random inte-
ger. In our protocol, the session key SK is calculated as
SK=h(UIDi||Lus||Nu||Ns||w) between Sj and Ui with the
use of UIDi, Lus, Nu, Ns, and w parameters. Nonetheless, the
capturing of {w,UID∗i ,M1,M2, Tu,M3,M4,M5, and M6}
factors in communication messages would not help I in
evaluating the factors UIDi, Lus, Nu, Ns in SK. Since, their
computation also requires access to long term private keys
(Ks and Ku) and the seizure of PUFi circuit held with the
users. Thus, the probability for wining G1 by interception of
communication factors is not increased. Hence,
Pr[Succs0] = Pr[Succs1]. (6)
Game G2: The game G1 is converted into G2 by adding
Send and hash-based oracle queries. Due to those queries
it may be termed as an active attack while I may attempt
for deceiving a legitimate member by using fabricated and
modified messages. I may issue many queries of Hash oracle
to monitor the collisions. It is mention worthy that all openly
exchanged parameters in authentication procedure carry the
entity’s identity, arbitrarily defined variables, and long term
private keys. Therefore, no collision is traced if I initiates





Game G3: The G3 is developed from G2 with the addition
of modeling for Send and PUF oracle-based queries. Thus,
pursuing the analogous argument as in G2 in consideration of





Game G4: In game G4, the simulation for
Corrupt Device is incorporated, such that I could get
the stored information {h(·), Gi, Hi,W, r∗, FA∗} from
device of the user. Nevertheless, I cannot extort the
identity or private key Ku of user which is safe due to
fingerprint-based fuzzy extractor function Bf ε{0, 1}l. Due to
incorporating PUF , the probability for guessing biometrics is
Bf is 12l [19]. The use of PUF and fuzzy extractor obviates
the need password in registration or authentication phase. 
The identity IDi of user is concatenated with the private 
secret Ku, and is not guessable due to the collision- resistant 
feature of hash. Therefore, it yields






The intruder I employs all of these queries, while the last
possibility of winning the game is only random guessing of





Referring to (5), (6) and (10), we have
1
2







= |Pr[Succs1]− Pr[Succs4]| (12)
With the application of triangular inequality as well as Eqs.
(7), (8), and (9), we have the following outcome:
|Pr[Succs1]− Pr[Succs4]| ≤ |Pr[Succs1]− Pr[Succs3]|














Using Eqs. (11), (12) and (13), it yields











1) Supports mutual authentication: Our scheme supports
mutual authentication, since the server monitors absolute au-
thenticity of user on the basis of calculation and verification
of M2?=h(h(Ks||y)||NIDi||Nu||v||Tu). The server knows
that both parameters, i.e. NIDi as well as K equivalent to
h(Ks||y), are protected under the biometric factors of user.
Similarly, the user verifies the server on account of the same
credentials, which are accessible to server from the use of
private secret key Ks. However, the availability of these factors
to malicious intruder on simultaneous basis would be hard
assumption.
2) Resists impersonation and replay attacks: Our scheme
could resist user and server impersonation threats. If an
attacker tries to replay or manipulate seized messages for reis-
suing the authentication request towards server, then the latter
may confirm its genuineness by verifying the computed pa-
rameter M2?=h(h(Ks||y)||NIDi||Nu||v||Tu). The involved
timestamp Tu may thwart the replay attack on instant basis.
However, if we eliminate the timestamp from the protocol,
yet the server may nullify the possibility of replay attack
during the verification of M6?=h(SK||Mus||Ns). Besides, an
intruder may not compute M2 or M6 parameters according
to the randomly selected nonces NuI and NsI due to lack of
h(Ks||y) and NIDi credentials.
Fig. 3. Simulation Outcome
3) Supports perfect forward secrecy: Our scheme sup-
ports forward secrecy if long term secret keys of
server or user are compromised by the intruder, it
may not compute current or previous session keys
SK=h(NIDi||Mus||Nu||Ns||v||h(Cn∗i )). In order to com-
pute SK, besides the possession of private secret key Ks,
I also needs access to PUFi, Cni and Vi for computing the
session key SK [30], [31].
4) Resists de-synchronization attack: To resist the replay
attacks and untraceability problems, many authentication pro-
tocols employ synchronization parameters [27] which are
updated on both sides with the completion of session. Any
A may hold the communication messages by blocking the
channel from getting through towards legal entity, to desyn-
chronize the databases on both sides. However, our scheme is
resistant to this drawback since the server needs not storing
any synchronization parameter on its end [32].
5) Resists DoS attack: In many schemes the authentication
information of user is not properly included in its submitted
message towards server; as a result the latter will have to
frequently consult its secondary storage for verifying the user’s
identity. For instance, in [20] I may replay the intercepted
messages towards server and initiate a denial of service
attack towards server by exploiting the mentioned limitation.
However, our scheme is resistant to DoS attack.
6) Resists temporary information threat: In this proto-
col, if an intruder I recovers short term temporary se-
crets from the user’s database such as Nu, Ns, still the
former would not be able to evaluate the session key
SK=h(NIDi||Mus||Nu||Ns||v||h(Cn∗i )) because it requires
access to Ui’s private key Ku as well to compute Mus, which
is a strong assumption. At the same time, it requires access
to h(Ks||y) to compute h(Cn∗i ) for the session key, which
makes the scheme resistant to temporary information threat
[33].
7) Resists key compromise impersonation (KCI) threat:
If long term secret key of user Ku is exposed to I, the
later cannot construct a legitimate {M3,M4} message in
response to user’s request message for impersonating as a
server. Consequently, our scheme is resistant of KCI threat
[34].
E. Security Proof using ProVerif
The Proverif provides an automated tool [35] environ-
ment to simulate the key agreement scheme and verify its
properties on the benchmark of session key’s confidentiality
and mutual authenticity of involved legal entities. In this
connection, we designed the respective modules for verifying
the security features of contributed model employing the
Fig. 4. Throughput
Fig. 5. End-to-End Delay
ProVerif tool. This tool utilizes commonly applied principles
of π calculus that could support a number of state-of-the-
art crypto-primitives together with hash, symmetric key and
public key operations, encryption, and digital signatures etc.
For implementing the simulation, we engage two events Ui
and CS to execute the respective authentication codes. The
entity Ui utilizes two events, that is, beginUi(bitstring) and
endUi(bitstring) for authenticating server (CS). In the same
manner, the beginCS(bitstring) and endCS(bitstring) events are
used by server for authenticating user. The results of queries
are computed, which exhibit the stability of the order both
pairs of events. The simulation findings are depicted in Fig.
3. which show that the contributed model ensures mutual
authenticity for the involved legal participants against the
attacker.
F. NS2 Simulation
The experimental demonstration of the proposed scheme
using network simulation tool (NS2 2.35) [31] on hardware
HP-E8300-Core i5), 2.93 GHz processor with 6GB RAM
using Ubuntu 16.12 OS is presetned in this subsection. The
network performance of our scheme is measured with the
benchmark parameters, i.e., end-to-end delay and throughput.
The simulation parameters are given below. The total time
of our simulation is 2400 seconds (40 minutes). The mobile
users were positioned in rectangular area of 180 ×130m2 with
eight rows, while there were 8 users in a single row having
inter-distance of 22 meters. We placed 4 cloud servers with
50m of user-based neighbors. A single controlling authority for
managing servers was positioned in the network simulation.
We employed Adhoc On-Demand Distance Vector (AODV)
routing protocol and MAC based wireless channel between
user and cloud server, and peer to peer channel between cloud
server and controlling authority. We considered all types of
static as well as moving users for five different scenarios. The
number of users increases from scenario 1 to scenario 5. The
speeds for the mobile users range from 2-15 meters per second.
1) End-to-End delay (EED): EED is the average time that
takes a message to reach its destination from its source,
and can be expressed as
∑Nm
i=1(Tr − Ts)/Nm, where Ts
and Tr represent the sending and receiving time of packet
i, respectively. The notation Nm is the aggregate number
of messages. The EED includes the sending and receiving
time for establishing the mutually agreed session key between
the two participants, which is of paramount importance for
an authentication protocol, since it must be less for few
involved users in the protocol. According to simulation, the
EED values range from 0.00382, 0.00453, 0.00535, 0.00621,
0.00753 seconds for five scenarios, respectively. This keeps on
increasing with more number of users (8-68) and congestion.
Fig. 5 shows the EED of our scheme in milliseconds.
2) Throughput: The throughput characterizes the number of
bits transmitted in a unit time. Fig. 4 depicts the throughput
of the proposed scheme in bits per second (bps) for three
scenarios. The throughput can be expressed as Npr×|PKTS |Td ,
where Npr is the number of received packets, Td be the
aggregate time in sec, and |PKTS | is the size of packet.
The recorded values of throughput in simulation are 372.41,
432.31, 586.28, 712.73, 885.92 bps for scenarios 1 to 5. The
throughput is increased with the increase in the number of
exchanged messages due to the more number of users. Thus,
the scheme shows high throughput with more number of users.
VI. EFFICIENCY ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION
We demonstrate the comparative analysis of security prop-
erties in Table II. Our protocol satisfies all of the mentioned
security properties, while all other schemes are prone to
at least one or more security limitations. To conduct the
analysis based on the computational overheads in different
phases among proposed and several related schemes. The
analysis of the computational costs for compared schemes is
shown in Table IV. In Table IV, the cryptographic operation
TPUF represents the PUF-based cost of operation, TEPM the
elliptic curve point multiplication, Tm the cost of modular
exponentiation operation, Th the cost of hashing function, Ts
the symmetric encryption or decryption cost, TFEG the cost of
fuzzy extractor-based generation function, and TFEC the cost
of fuzzy extractor-based reproduction function. Although, it
is evident that the computational cost of proposed scheme
is a bit higher than [7], [21], however it is proved to be
resilient against well known attacks. Besides, there is no need
of password-based login verification, it requires only identity
and fingerprint-based biometric operation captured using fuzzy
extractor-in-the-loop.
Our scheme has comparable security features and effi-
ciency than schemes [7], [12], [21]–[23]. Being a symmet-
ric cryptographic protocol, the contributed authentication key
agreement is equally practical for sensor networks, internet
of things (IoT), and smart devices which are deficient in
power resources. For rigorous evaluation of the performance
of proposed protocol, the experimental simulation has been
TABLE III
COMPARISON OF SECURITY FUNCTIONALITIES
Schemes [21] [22] [12] [23] [20] [7] [25] [27] [26] Ours
Supports Anonymity and untraceability × × × X X X X X × X
Login viability without password × × X X X X X X X X
Resist stolen device attack × X X × X X X X X X
Resist insider attack × X X X X X X X X X
Resist replay attack × X × X X X X X X X
Resist user impersonation attack × × X X X X X X X X
Resist server impersonation attack × × X × X X X X × X
Resist Man-in-the-middle attack × X X × × X X X X X
Resist known key secrecy attack X X × × X X X X X X
Resist temporary information attack X × × X X X X X X X
Supports perfect forward secrecy X X X X × × X X X X
Supports mutual authentication × × X X X X X X X X
Supports session key agreement × X X X X X X X X X
Resist denial of service attack X X X X × X X X X X
Resist de-synchronization attack × X X X X × × × × X
Two factor authentication without password × × × × X × × × × X
Supports efficient symmetric key operations X × × × X X X × × X
Resists Key compromise impersonation attacks X X X X × X X X X X
× Feature not supported, XFeature supported
TABLE IV
COMPUTATIONAL COSTS
Scheme Registration phase (Reg) Ui Sj Total Latency
[21] 3Th 4Th 10Th 17Th 0.143 ms
[22] 1Th + 1Tm 2Th + 2Tm 4Th + 5Tm 7Th + 8Tm 36.46 ms
[12] 3Th + 1TFEG 6Th + 2Tm + 1TFEC 14Th + 4Tm + 1TFEG + 1TFEC 23Th + 6Tm + 2TFEG + 2TFEC 40.28 ms
[23] 3Th + 2Tm + 1TFEG 5Th + 5Tm + 1TFEC 2Th + 1Tm 10Th + 6Tm + 1TFEG + 1TFEC 58.45 ms
[20] 7Th + 1TPUF + 1TFEG 12Th + 1TPUF + 1TFEG + 1TFEC 7Th + 1TFEC 26Th + 2TPUF + 2TFEG + 2TFEC 9.95 ms
[7] 2Th + 1TPUF + 1TFEG 10Th + 5TPUF + 1TFEC 7Th 21Th + 6TPUF + 1TFEG + 1TFEC 4.76 ms
[25] 3Th + 1TPUF 5Th + 2TPUF + 1TFEG 5Th + 1tFEG 13Th + 3TPUF + 1TFEG + 1TFEC 6.21 ms
[27] 5Th + 1TS + 1TFEG 7Th + 2TEPM + 1TFEC 6Th + 2TEPM + 2TS 18Th + 4TEPM + 2TS + 1TFEC + 1TFEG 36.12 ms
[26] 5Th + 1TS 7Th + 2TEPM + 1TS 5Th + 2TEPM + 2TS 17Th + 4TEPM + 4TS 32.60 ms
Ours 8Th + 1TPUF+1TFEG 16Th + 1TPUF + 1TS + 1TFEG + 1TFEC 7Th + 1TFEC + 3TS 31Th + 2TPUF + 4TS + 2TFEG + 2TFEC 10.19 ms
performed by employing a Smartphone (Lenovo Zuk Z1)
bearing Quad-core 2.6 GHz-processor and 6GB RAM having
Android OS V5.1.2, and a server PC (HP-E8300-Core i5),
2.93 GHz processor with 6GB RAM using Ubuntu 16.12 OS).
The execution timings of all cryptographic operations used
in proposed as well as compared schemes are evaluated by
using JCE library [16]. Moreover, the 128-bit arbiter PUF is
utilized in PUF-based operation, while BCH code has been
used for fuzzy extractor (FE)-based generation Gen(·) and
reproduction Rep(·) operations.
In accordance with the experimental setting, we get the
following outcomes: The hash operation Th takes 0.029ms on
Ui’s mobile device, and 0.009ms at the server’s end; the PUF
operation TPUF takes 0.145ms on Ui’s device and 0.68ms
at server; the fuzzy extractor-based Gen(·) operation TFEG
and Rep(·) operation TFEC takes 3.67 on user’s end, while
2.06ms at server; a modular exponentiation operation Tm takes
12.42 ms and 5.78 ms at server, the symmetric encryption or
decryption TS takes 0.062ms on Ui’s device and 0.019 ms at
server; the elliptic curve based point multiplication operation
takes 10.92 ms and 5.16 ms at server. The computational
network latency of proposed scheme is computed as 10.19 ms,
i.e 23Th + 1TPUF +1TFEG+ 2TFEC +4TS , which is less than
schemes [12], [22], [23], [26], [27], but higher than [7], [20],
[22], [25] as shown in Table III. The schemes [12], [22], [23],
[26], [27] bear significantly higher computational cost due
to ECC based point multiplication or modular exponentiation
operations. Although, the computational cost of our schemes
is higher than schemes [7], [20], [22], [25], yet it is secure and
free of security limitations instilled in those protocols, as elab-
orated in Table III. The Table III shows that only two schemes,
that is, [12] and our scheme provide two-factor authentication
without the need of password. The [20] suffer from key
compromise impersonation attacks. The schemes [12], [22],
[23], [26], [27] employ heavy computational operations, that
is, non-symmetric key operations. The schemes [7], [25]–[27]
suffer de-synchronization attacks. The scheme [27] does not
support session key agreement, while [13] is prone to server
impersonation threat, offline-password guessing attacks, and
also lack mutual authentication, anonymity and untraceability.
Similarly, [22] also suffer many security issues as depicted
in Table III. It is also evident from the graph in Fig. 6, the
proposed scheme supports most of the security features in
spite of employing light-weight symmetric key operations. The
Table IV represents the number of crypto-primitives used in
different schemes, which indicates that the proposed scheme
bears high number of low cost hash operations, and low
number of high cost operations. In this scheme our objective
is to ensure PFS using lightweight symmetric key operations,
besides maintaining the other security properties as indicated
in Table III.
VII. CONCLUSION
The rise of the fuzzy logic-based biometric applications
endows with sufficient intelligence in uncertain biometric-
based security solutions to make them reliable. This work,
therefore, proposed a two-factor biometric authentication pro-
tocol between user and server which, in a novel way, employs
the characteristics of PUFs and fuzzy extractor-enabled user
biometrics. The intelligent, secure, and dependable protocol
could ensure untraceability and perfect forward secrecy, and
Fig. 6. Comparative findings
is resilient to the DoS and de-synchronization attacks, the main
issues posed to the symmetric key-based schemes. Moreover,
the presented scheme purges the likelihood of the leakage of
the biometric information from the device. The scheme does
not need user password in registration and login phases, unlike
previous schemes. The security features of the contributed
scheme are proved under formal security analysis using the
ROR model. In future, we intend to further optimize the
mobile user and cloud server interaction with the help of
PUF-based fuzzy-in-the-loop solutions in the federated envi-
ronment.
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